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A COMPARISON OF PARTISAN-GERRYMANDERING MEASURES
GREGORY S. WARRINGTON
Abstract. We compare and contrast fourteen measures that have been proposed for the purpose of
quantifying partisan gerrymandering. We consider measures that, rather than examining the shapes
of districts, utilize only the partisan vote distribution among districts. The measures considered
are two versions of partisan bias; the efficiency gap and several of its variants; the mean-median
difference and the equal vote weight standard; the declination and one variant; and the lopsided-
means test. Our primary means of evaluating these measures is a suite of hypothetical elections
we classify from the start as fair or unfair. We conclude that the declination is the most successful
measure in terms of avoiding false positives and false negatives on the elections considered. We
include in an appendix the most extreme outliers for each measure among historical congressional
and state legislative elections.
1. Introduction
A partisan gerrymander occurs when one political party illicitly draws electoral district lines to
its own advantage. A number of measures that are based on how voters of each party are distributed
among districts have been proposed as aids to identifying partisan gerrymanders. Unfortunately,
there is no consensus as to which of these measures works the best.
There have been several efforts to compare some of the proposed measures. In (Stephanopoulos
& McGhee, 2017), the authors explore the extent to which each of a number of measures adheres to
various desiderata. These analyses are performed by considering historical and simulated elections
in the aggregate1. In (Best et al., 2017), the authors consider an overlapping set of measures, but
do so with different evaluative criteria applied in the context of two specific elections. In (Nagle,
December 2015, 2017), a number of measures are compared and contrasted, both on theoretical
grounds and in the context of a handful of specific elections. We refer the reader to (Tapp, 2018)
for an expository review of many of the “wasted vote”-derived measures.
In this article we take a different tack to that taken in the aforementioned studies. Rather
than focusing on just one or two elections or on elections in the aggregate, we focus on a dozen
hypothetical elections, each selected so as to highlight various aspects of both fair and of unfair
elections. Additionally, rather than evaluate elections based on abstract utility functions, we ground
our evaluations in specific classes of elections that we believe should be considered either fair or
unfair. Of course, our classification of each of these hypothetical elections is ultimately open to
debate: there is no gold standard to which we can appeal. Notwithstanding this unavoidable truth,
we aim to present our results in a way that is illuminating even if the reader rejects both of the
postulates upon which we base our classifications.
The measures we consider in this article are closely related in that they all look at the partisan
vote by district. Most are closely tied to the seats-votes curve, that elusive function by which votes
are turned into seats. But the measures vary widely in how much scrutiny they have been subjected
to. The efficiency gap, explored extensively in (McGhee & Stephanopoulos, 2015), has achieved
prominence through its usage in Whitford v. Gill (Whitford, 2016a) and has become the de facto
1In this article, “election” effectively refers to the results of a given election as encoded in the collection of
Democratic vote shares across districts. For historical elections, these values are, of course, affected by everything
from the overall electoral climate to the district plan in use to the rules governing the election.
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standard for partisan gerrymandering measures. In spite of this success, or perhaps because of it,
it has been the subject of numerous critiques (see, e.g., (Whitford, 2016b; Cho, 2017; Cover, April
2018; Bernstein & Duchin, 2017; Veomett, 2018)). On the other hand we have measures such as the
winning efficiency, mentioned almost in passing in (Cho, 2017), for which there has been essentially
no study.
We come to several conclusions from our investigations of these measures. First, none of the
“wasted-votes” variations of the efficiency gap appear to markedly improve upon it. Second, two
of the other most widely cited measures, partisan bias and the mean-median difference, struggle
in a number of ways. Third, the recently proposed declination measure performs robustly on
the entire slate of elections we consider in this article and is therefore our recommendation for a
general-purpose measure.
1.1. Issues not addressed in this article. Measures based on the vote distribution are far from
being the only technique for quantifying or investigating partisan gerrymanders. Irregularly shaped
districts have long been viewed as the sine qua non of gerrymanders. A number of compactness
metrics have been developed to quantify these irregularities. Even though compactness metrics are
undeniably important, we view them as a complementary class of measures and do not consider
them in this article.
Computer simulations have proved to be increasingly useful in investigating gerrymandering.
Much of this utility stems from the ability to generate a baseline for what properties a fair district
plan should have. A baseline generated in this manner can take into account specifics such as local
geography, county boundaries and how partisans are distributed geographically. Simulations can
also be used to investigate measures themselves (see, e.g., (Chatterjee et al., 2018)). As with the
compactness measures, we consider computer simulations to be outside the scope of this article, in
spite of their status as an important technique for quantifying gerrymandering.
We assume in this study that, for a given election, turnout is equal for each district. A more
general analysis would consider the very real complication that turnout can vary widely. We have
chosen for several reasons to not consider this more general setup. Primarily, we do so because
equal turnout is the simplest case. If a measure doesn’t do a good job when turnout is equal, then
we see no reason to suppose it will be useful in more taxing scenarios. There are also two practical
reasons for our choice. First, not all of the measures we consider have been clearly defined for
unequal turnout, although there are reasonable extensions for each of them. Second, we feel that
considering multiple measures on multiple vote distributions with multiple variations in turnout
is unmanageable for a single article. So, as much as unequal turnout is an important factor that
requires further investigation, we defer it to another article.
Our focus in this article is on moderate-sized elections in which both parties enjoy significant
statewide support. We have chosen an arbitrary threshold of seven seats for our historical explo-
rations in Section 4; our hypothetical elections in Section 5 all have at least ten seats and none
are in the hundreds, as is the case for many state legislatures. We set a minimum size because we
expect the strengths and weaknesses of the measures to be significantly different in small elections.
We note that the declination is undefined when one party sweeps the election, as happens, for
example, 63%, 32% and 3% of the time when there are two, four and six seats, respectively. Only
one percent of elections with at least seven seats are swept by one party. Relatedly, the measure
EG2 won’t consider any election as fair when one party garners more than 66% of the statewide
vote as the dominant party will necessarily waste votes. This happens frequently in small states
(for example, 9% of elections with five seats), but occurs only about one percent of the time when
there are at least seven seats.
Finally, we also limit our analysis to the realm of quantification of gerrymandering: We do not
include any discussion of the legal aspects of the gerrymandering problem. Discussions such as those
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in (McGann et al., December 2015) on the constitutional basis for supporting a given measure are
beyond the scope of this article. Nor do we attempt to create a “manageable standard” that can
be readily used by the courts (see, e.g., (McGhee & Stephanopoulos, 2015) or (Wang, June 2016)).
Such aspirations, while laudable, add a completely new dimension to the issue. Furthermore,
quantitative measures of gerrymandering can prove useful outside of the courts. Even if a measure
cannot directly serve as justification for the invalidation of a district plan on constitutional grounds,
it can still serve as an aid to a redistricting commission evaluating submitted plans, for educational
outreach, or for helping our understanding of issues such as the effects of partisan gerrymandering
(see, e.g., Warshaw & Stephanopoulos (2019)).
1.2. Outline of article. In Section 2 we explore what it means to be a partisan gerrymander. As
part of this exploration, we present two postulates describing a class of elections that should be
evaluated as fair and another that should be evaluated as unfair. We introduce the measures we
consider in this article in Section 3. In Section 4 we evaluate the measures on historical elections.
In addition to their inherent interest as data, the distributions generated in this step are necessary
for understanding how to interpret individual values of each measure. In Section 5 we move on to
evaluating hypothetical elections in order to identify scenarios under which measures return false
positives or false negatives. Section 6 explores the sensitivity of each measure to statewide vote
share. We close in Sections 7 and 8 with a discussion and our conclusions, respectively.
2. Gerrymandering, gerrymanders and partisan asymmetry
In order to evaluate gerrymandering measures, we need to describe carefully what it is we wish to
measure. We will distinguish in the following way between the verb gerrymandering and the noun
gerrymander. For us, gerrymandering is the process of attempting to create a map that illicitly
favors one or more groups. The extent to which the gerrymanderers are successful in achieving
their aims may have legal importance, but it does not affect their intent. In this sense, determining
whether or not someone is gerrymandering is not, assuming full information, a difficult question:
What are the motives for the choices they are making?
Defining a gerrymander is a trickier matter. It can’t just be the lines on a map — if all the
residents of a state are avowed Democrats, then strange boundaries do not directly serve a partisan
purpose of the sort we are interested in. On the other hand, we can’t expect a measure such as
those we will discuss in this article to be able to know the intent of the map drawers. Since part
of being a partisan gerrymander is, according to our definition, the fact that it has been drawn
illicitly, no function based solely on the distribution of votes can definitively identify a district
plan as a gerrymander. Our solution is to evaluate the proposed measures as measures of partisan
asymmetry: Are the two parties treated equitably by the district plan? Any inequity that does
occur may stem from geography, be accidental, or as the result of intentional gerrymandering; by
itself, the measure can take no meaningful stand on the source of the inequity.
The next step is to define what we mean by partisan asymmetry. This in itself is a difficult
matter as any precise definition is tantamount to defining a measure of the type we are trying to
independently evaluate. We therefore take the indirect approach of articulating identifiable char-
acteristics of fair district plans and of unfair ones. Once this is done, we will be in a position to
label the various elections from Section 5 as either false positives or false negatives for individual
measures. We aim in the below to take a minimal set of two postulates for identifying these char-
acteristics. A different choice of postulates would, of course, lead to different conclusions regarding
false positives/negatives.
Postulate 1: A linear vote distribution should be characterized as fair.
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By “linear” we mean the Democratic vote fractions, when sorted in increasing order, lie ap-
proximately along a line. All slopes are considered equally appropriate. One notable property of
these distributions is that when a uniform vote shift is applied to give each party equal statewide
support, each party wins half of the seats. It is also worth mentioning that these distributions yield
symmetric seats-votes curves. Finally, Postulate 1 is merely stating a sufficient condition on what
it means to be fair; it does not place any restrictions on the other vote distributions that should
also be considered fair.
The slope of such a linear vote distribution is usually expressed in terms of responsiveness or pro-
portionality: m-proportionality occurs when (50 +x)% of the statewide vote leads to (50 +m ·x)%
of the seats. Historically, elections often show between 2- and 3-proportionality (see (Tufte, 1973)),
but we intentionally do not enshrine any particular proportionality constant as the one correct
value. The “correct” responsiveness, if there is one, is as suggested by (Warrington, Mar 2018,
Fig. 2C & D), dependent on how partisans are distributed geographically. If the two groups are
distributed homogeneously, we would expect all districts to have essentially the same vote split
— this leads to very high responsiveness. Achieving low responsiveness, and the concomitant un-
competitive districts, would likely require contorted districts so as to string together local pockets
where the majority party is slightly more dominant than the statewide average. By restricting our
attention to vote distributions, we are foregoing important geographic information that is crucial
for illuminating what is or is not a partisan gerrymander. This is why it is better to view vote
distribution-based measures as identifying asymmetry or inequity, rather than as a conclusive tech-
nique for ascribing an asymmetry to partisan gerrymandering.
Postulate 2: A vote distribution should be characterized as unfair if the average winning margin
for the party winning a majority of the seats is significantly less than the average winning margin
for the opposition party.
Postulate 2 encodes the direct consequences of packing and cracking: The minority party wastes
votes in a few overwhelming wins while the majority party efficiently wins a large number of rel-
atively narrow victories. As additional support for Postulate 2, we observe that the 2012 North
Carolina US House election has a distribution exactly of the form described. This district plan sets
off alarm bells no matter how one looks at it: the district plan was drawn by one party (Levitt,
2018); a politician involved in the process is on record admitting that it was a partisan gerryman-
der (Gannon, June 20, 2016); the seats won by the Democrats are far below their statewide vote (4
of 13 seats with 50.60% of the total vote (Wikipedia, 2018b)); and the proportion of seats won by
Democrats is significantly less than what they won in 2010 even though their statewide support im-
proved over 2010 (Democrats won 7 of 13 seats in 2010 with 45.24% of the total vote (Wikipedia,
2018a)). A measure that doesn’t mark the 2012 North Carolina House election as an outlier is
missing the closest thing we have to an a universally acknowledged partisan gerrymander.
Absent from our two postulates is any mention of competitiveness. This is because our primary
goal in this article is to evaluate measures of partisan asymmetry. While lack of competitiveness
might be indicative of bipartisan (incumbency) gerrymandering, it has no direct bearing on partisan
gerrymandering. Said another way, assessing a district plan according to whether it will aid or
hinder competitiveness is a worthy goal. But we consider competitiveness as a confounding factor
for our question and one that should not provide a strong signal to partisan-asymmetry measures.
Nonetheless, the degree of competitiveness should provide some signal. It would be a stretch
to call an election the result of a gerrymander if the Democrats lose three districts with 49.3%
of the vote while winning seven others with 50.3% of the vote. But a much stronger claim of
gerrymandering could be levied if they lose three districts with 36% of the vote while winning
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seven others with 56% of the vote. Yet all that has changed is a factor-of-20 increase in winning
margins.
Another quality of measures seen as desirable is stability under changing electoral climates. In
fact, some authors2 argue that a gerrymander exists independently of the ebb and flow of partisan
support and that measures should recognize the gerrymander for what it is regardless of how the
statewide support for each party changes. We do not believe this is most efficacious point of view. If
one party suddenly becomes wildly popular, it likely doesn’t matter at all how the lines are drawn:
the opposing party isn’t going to win a single seat. A simple function, based only on the partisan
vote distribution, isn’t going to be able to recognize gerrymandering that expected a completely
different electoral climate. Less drastically, it seems reasonable, even preferable, that a measure
return a maximum value of unfairness for a given level of partisan support and gradually reduce in
value as support deviates from the expectation.
We view too much stability as a sign that the measure is not capturing the essence of a partisan
gerrymander: the ability to turn votes into seats. On the other hand, if a measure is too sensitive to
such swings then it becomes useless. A measure that frequently registers a strong pro-Democratic
advantage with a given statewide level of Democratic party support but a strong pro-Republican
advantage under a uniform partisan swing of one percent is not going to be very useful.
Together these issues lead us to the following principle to use as a secondary basis on which to
evaluate our measures. We state this principle in order to explicitly acknowledge that there are
other important grounds on which to evaluate measures. These other grounds are related to, but
distinct from, false positives and false negatives. We do not attempt to specify precisely how much
“too much” or “too little” is.
The Goldilocks Principle: A measure should have neither too much nor too little sensitivity to
both competitiveness and overall statewide support.
3. Gerrymandering measures
In this article we will view an election with N districts as a triple consisting of two parties D
(Democrats) and R (Republicans) along with a sequence
(1) p = 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pk ≤ 1
2
< pk+1 ≤ pk+2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN ≤ 1,
where pi denotes the fraction of the two-party vote won by Party D in district i. We display our
elections by plotting the pi values along a vertical axis with districts indexed along the horizontal
axis. Let p be the statewide fraction of the vote attained by Party D.
We have chosen to focus in this article only on those measures that depend solely on p. It is
worth mentioning that there are other non-geographic measures that are excluded by this criterion.
For example, in (Bangia et al., 2017), the gerrymandering index and the representativeness index
are defined as measures of gerrymandering. However, these measures utilize simulated district plans
in their definitions in an integral manner. Fortunately, all of the measures we do consider in this
article can be combined with computer simulations if so desired.
The measures and acronyms defined in this section are summarized in Table 1.
3.1. The efficiency gap and its variants. The first class of measures we consider all rely on
the notion of a wasted vote. We should emphasize that all of the measures trace their lineage back
to the efficiency gap (which we will write as EG1) introduced in (McGhee, 2014) and explored
in (McGhee & Stephanopoulos, 2015). Each of the variants introduced was an attempt to improve
upon it.
2For example: “Moreover, if a standard sometimes identifies the same set of districts as a gerrymander with respect
to some elections and a non-gerrymander with respect to other elections, we know with assurance it is committing
errors,” (Best et al., 2017, pg. 4).
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In the context of the original efficiency gap, a wasted vote is a vote for a losing candidate or
a vote for a winning candidate that is in excess of the 50%+1 needed to win. Following others
(see (Cover, April 2018; Nagle, December 2015, 2017)) we define a slightly more general function
that incorporates a parameter λ:
wλD(i) =
{
pi, if Party D loses district i,
λ · (pi − 1/2), if Party D wins district i.
Note that as defined, wλD(i) actually keeps track of the fraction of votes in district i that are wasted
rather than the total number of votes. For each district we define wλR(i) analogously. The efficiency
gap and its variants all work by comparing the number of votes wasted by Party D to the number
wasted by Party R. For general λ, we can define (after (Nagle, 2017)) the weighted efficiency gap,
(2) EGλ =
∑N
i=1(w
λ
D(i)− wλR(i))
N
.
The only values of λ we know of that have been seriously considered in the literature are λ ∈
{0, 1, 2}, so we likewise restrict our attention to these. The efficiency gap (McGhee, 2014; McGhee
& Stephanopoulos, 2015) is EG1. It has been suggested in several places (Whitford, 2016b; Cover,
April 2018; Nagle, 2017) that wasted winning votes in a district should be relative to the losing
party vote rather than to the 50% threshold. This can be achieved by considering EG2. Also
considered in (Nagle, 2017) is the case in which only losing votes are counted as wasted. This leads
to the use of EG0. We note that EG1 will not find any election fair if one party garners more than
75%; the same is true for EG2 at a threshold of 66%.
In (Cho, 2017) the author asserts that winning and losing wasted votes should not be treated
equally. She proposes a winning efficiency that does not include votes wasted towards losses at all:∑N
i=k+1w
1
D(i)−
∑k
i=1w
1
R(i)
2N
.
It turns out that the winning efficiency reduces to the difference in statewide support between the
two parties. As such, it considers an election to be fair if and only if the parties each garner 50% of
the statewide vote. Statewide support is an environmental factor that is not, by itself, indicative
of whether or not a gerrymander has been drawn. This makes it useless for quantifying partisan
gerrymanders and we discuss it no more in this article.
The authors in (Nagle, 2017) and (Cover, April 2018) suggest comparing the fraction of Demo-
cratic votes that are wasted to the fraction of Republican votes that are wasted. Given a parameter
λ we define
EGλv =
∑N
i=1w
λ
D(i)∑N
i=1 pi
−
∑N
i=1w
λ
R(i)∑N
i=1(1− pi)
.
We consider here only the two “vote-centric” versions of the efficiency gap given by EG1v and EG
2
v.
Finally, (Warrington, Mar 2018) introduces the τ -Gap measure which weights votes according
to a function parameterized by a non-negative real number τ . The idea behind the definition is
that votes close to the fifty-percent threshold are less wasted than those at either extreme. When
τ = 0, the τ -Gap reduces to twice the efficiency gap. The precise definition for general τ requires
an integral which we do not attempt to replicate here. We will restrict our attention in this article
to the value of τ = 1 and denote the measure by EG1τ .
3.2. The declination and a variant. The declination, introduced in (Warrington, Mar 2018)
(see also (Warrington, 2018b)), is essentially an angle associated to the vote distribution. It can
be thought of as a measure of differential responsiveness, albeit one that is anchored at the actual
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Figure 1. Definition of the declination measure.
statewide level of support between the two parties rather than at 50%. It depends on four quantities:
the average winning margin of each party and the fraction of seats each party wins.
Recall from equation (1) that there are assumed to be k districts won by Party R out of N total.
Let k′ denote the number of districts won by Party D (so k + k′ = N). Define half of the average
winning margin for parties R and D, respectively, as
(3) y =
1
k
k∑
i=1
(1/2− pi) and z = 1
k′
N∑
i=k+1
(pi − 1/2).
If k = 0 or k′ = 0, the declination is undefined. Otherwise, we set θD = arctan
(
2z
k′/N
)
and
θR = arctan
(
2y
k/N
)
and define the declination as Dec = 2(θD− θR)/pi (see Figure 1). Note that the
declination is not using the Democratic vote in the median district won by Democrats, but rather
the mean of these values.
The buffered declination, Dec′, is computed analogously to the declination except that we intro-
duce m = dN/20e districts with pi = 0.5 and m districts with pi = 0.5001 into the election (so k
and k′ are each increased by m in equation (3)). The modifications of y and z can be interpreted
as adding m evenly split districts to those the Democrats win and m evenly split districts to those
the Republicans win. The rationale for doing this is that it buffers the angle in cases for which
one side wins a small fraction of the seats; this reduces the sensitivity to the exact vote fractions
in the minority seats. When the sides are evenly matched, there is little effect besides an overall
reduction in values.
3.3. Measures arising from the seats-votes curve. The mean-median difference, defined as
MM = p −median(p), has been considered by a number of authors such as in (Nagle, December
2015; Wang, June 2016). Here p is the average of the pi, or, assuming equal turnout in all districts,
the statewide vote fraction for Party D. For N odd, the median is p(N−1)/2; for N even, the median
is defined as the average of pN/2 and p1+N/2.
Partisan bias (Gelman & King, 1994a) aims to evaluate the degree to which the two parties would
win different fractions of the total seats for the same level of popular support. We consider two
versions. The first compares the seat share each party would win if support were to be uniformly
shifted to 50% for each party:
Bias =
1
2
− |{i : pi > p}|
N
.
For the second share, we compare the seat share the Democrats hold at the level of p for statewide
support with the seat share the Republicans would hold at the level of 1 − p statewide support.
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Table 1. Summary of measures considered and their acronyms.
Acronym Measure
EG1 Efficiency gap: comparison of wasted votes.
EG2 Margin efficiency gap: Variant of EG1 in which wasted votes are relative to losing
party vote.
EG0 Losing efficiency gap: Variant of EG1 in which only losing wasted votes are com-
pared.
EG1v Vote-centric efficiency gap: Variant of EG
1 in which each comparison is between the
fraction of votes wasted by each party rather than between the absolute amounts.
EG2v Vote-centric losing efficiency gap: Combination of EG
2 and EG1v.
EG1τ τ -Gap: Variant of EG
1 in which votes are weighted according to a function param-
eterized by τ .
Dec Declination: A measure of differential responsiveness.
Dec′ Buffered declination: Variant of Dec that is less sensitive in cases in which one party
wins most of the votes.
MM Mean-median difference: A comparison of the median and mean of distribution.
Bias Partisan bias: A comparison of the seat share at 50% of the statewide vote.
Bias′ Specific asymmetry: Variant of partisan bias that focuses on symmetry relative to
observed vote.
Lop Lopsided means: A comparison of the average winning margins of parties.
EVW Equal vote weight: Variant of MM that requires an anti-majoritarian outcome for
a positive result.
The partisan bias at the observed level of support is then:
Bias′ =
|{i : pi + 1− 2p < 1/2}| − |{i : pi > 1/2}|
2N
.
This variant is referred to as the specific asymmetry in (Baas & McAuliffe, 2017).
3.4. Conditioned measures. The measures of the previous three subsections provide quantitative
measures, when defined, for any election. The following two proposals are partially tests, in the
sense of (McGhee, Augest 11, 2017), rather than pure measures: The focus is not only on the
numerical value associated to the election, but also on whether a given condition is satisfied and,
hence, whether a threshold has been crossed that warrants remediation.
The lopsided means measure, Lop, proposed in (Wang, June 2016), computes the average winning
margin of Party D minus the average winning margin of Party R. In the notation of (3), this is
just z − y. While this can be used as its own, standalone measure, Wang argues for using this
measure in conjunction with a Student t-test. Under this framework, the measure only indicates
gerrymandering if the difference in margins is statistically significant at p < 0.05. For most of this
article we will work with the measure alone, however in the discussion we explore some of the issues
involved with invoking a statistical test in this context.
The equal vote weight standard (Best et al., 2017), EVW, is equivalent to the mean-median
measure, but subject to the constraint that a gerrymander is indicated exactly when the party
winning a majority of the statewide vote wins a minority of the seats, i.e., an anti-majoritarian
outcome. Because of the numerical equivalency with the mean-median measure, EVW will not
figure prominently in this article, however we will return to it in the discussion.
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Table 2. Mean and standard deviation for the measures considered in this article
applied to the 1,166 elections in our data set with at least seven seats for which each
party wins at least one seat.
EG1 EG2 EG0 EG1v EG
2
v EG
1
τ Dec Dec
′ MM Bias Bias′ Lop EVW
Mean 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.00
Std Dev 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04
4. The measures on historical data
In Section 5 we will evaluate a number of hypothetical elections using the measures introduced above.
However, the resulting values will be difficult to interpret without some understanding of the distribution of
values we should expect to arise for each measure. (Does EG1v = 0.1 indicate an outlier for this accounting
of wasted votes, or an election well within historical norms?) To this end, we first evaluate the measures on
a large set of historical elections. With these data we can calculate a standard deviation for each measure.
These deviations allow us to compute the extent to which each hypothetical is marked, or is not marked, as
an outlier.
Our historical data set consists of state-level lower house elections since 1972 for which there are no
multi-member districts, as well as US House elections since 1972. This data set, used in (Redacted), is
described in detail therein. Two points are worth mentioning here. First, we ignore third-party candidates:
all pi represent fractions of the two-party vote
3. Second, in cases in which there are not candidates for both
parties, we impute the vote fraction4. Both issues are important for any application of these measures to
real-world elections. In this article, however, we are focused on individual measures rather than identifying
the particular states and years for which they find unfairness, so we do not dwell on these issues.
The partisan vote we assign to each district can come from either an actual election the district was used
for or from exogenous election data such as a statewide gubernatorial race. Each approach has its staunch
advocates (see, e.g., the conversation in (McGhee, Mar 2018) and (Best et al., Mar 2018)). In this article
we use the endogenous, two-party vote share. Using exogenous data would certainly change the particular
elections that appear as extreme examples in Table 3, in the appendix, and the exact values in Table 4.
In Table 2, we record the mean and standard deviation for each measure on the collection of historical
elections. Positive values indicate Republican advantages while negative values indicate Democratic advan-
tages. In Section 5 we will be comparing how different hypothetical elections are evaluated by different
measures. For this purpose it will be convenient for the remainder of the article to rescale each measure
so it has standard deviation equal to 1. This is done by dividing each of the formulas in Section 3 by the
corresponding standard deviation from Table 2.
In Figure 2 we display kernel density plots for each rescaled measure on the historical elections in our
data set. The plot has been split into three to avoid clutter; there is no significance to which of the three
subplots a given rescaled measure appears. Note that with these unitless rescaled measures, a value of (say)
2 denotes two standard deviations above the mean. Also note that we are not normalizing the measures —
that is we are not shifting the mean to zero.
Even though most of the measures we discuss generate “approximately normal” distributions from our
historical corpus in Figure 2, the standardization we apply does not depend on an assumption of normality.
It is perfectly meaningful to discuss standard deviations for non-normal distributions.
The next two subsections explore the aggregate data in more depth.
3Our data for congressional races do not include third-party candidates, but we note for reference that about 16%
of state legislative races in our data include a third-party candidate who won at least one percent of the total vote.
4Races that are not contested by both parties occur in some states two-thirds of the time for state-level house
elections — Wyoming, Georgia, Arkansas and South Carolina all slightly exceed this rate. There is no obvious
correspondence between high rates on uncontestedness and gerrymandering, although we have not delved into the
data in more than a superficial manner. Rates for congressional elections are much lower, the only states exceeding
30% are Alabama, Louisiana and Massachusetts.
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Figure 2. Kernel density plots for each rescaled measure. Plots are split into three
groups for clarity. We have overlaid a standard Gaussian distribution on each plot
for reference. The equal vote weights measure is omitted since it is numerically
equivalent to the mean-median difference.
Table 3. Outliers listed as last two digit of year along with state abbreviation. The
first group of ten corresponds to the population of the 647 most-balanced elections.
The second group of ten corresponds to the population of all 1,179 elections. In
each grouping, the most extreme outliers are listed first. An asterisk denotes a
state, rather than US House, election.
EG EG2 EG0 EG1v EG
2
v EG
1
τ Dec Dec’ MM Bias Bias’ Lop EVW
1 78 WA 78 WA 78 WA 78 WA 78 WA 78 WA 78 WA 12 PA 00 TN 96 WA 14 NC 96 WA 80 IL
2 94 WA 94 WA 94 WA 94 WA 94 WA 12 OH 12 OH 12 OH 06 GA 16 NC 04 AZ 80 WA 04 MI
3 12 OH 06 MI 12 OH 12 OH 12 OH 12 PA 14 NC 16 PA 06 TN 12 NC 12 OH 94 WA 88 KY
4 12 PA 96 WA 14 NC 12 IN 12 PA 14 NC 12 PA 14 NC 06 MO 14 NC 12 NC 94 AL 88 WI
5 94 MN 12 PA 12 IN 14 NC 94 MN 94 WA 94 WA 12 MI 80 IL 12 OH 12 VA 98 AL 98 TX
6 96 WA 12 MI 94 MN 94 MN 14 NC 16 NC 12 VA 06 MI 80 KY 04 AZ 12 PA 12 WI 84 WI
7 12 NC 10 IL 16 NC 16 NC 12 VA 12 IN 16 NC 14 PA 06 AL 06 VA 96 WA 14 NJ 78 IL
8 12 VA 12 OH 12 PA 12 PA 96 WA 16 PA 16 PA 92 TX 96 VA 12 VA 16 PA 94 VA 02 IL
B
a
la
n
c
e
d
e
le
c
ti
o
n
s
9 14 NC 12 NC 12 VA 12 VA 12 NC 94 MN 72 KY 12 NC 08 GA 12 PA 80 WA 84 TN 14 MI
10 80 WA 06 OH 06 VA 06 VA 12 IN 12 VA 06 VA 10 IL 04 MO 16 PA 72 KY 72 MN 16 MI
1 10 MA 06 NY* 10 MA 10 MA 10 MA 10 MA 80 VA 92 HI* 74 AL 16 SC 14 NC 86 MD 80 IL
2 78 WA 08 NY* 14 MA 14 MA 78 WA 14 MA 90 MA 12 PA 72 AL 14 AL 04 AZ 82 AL 04 MI
3 94 WA 06 NY 02 MA 02 MA 14 MA 02 MA 76 TX 12 OH 00 TN 12 AL 12 OH 74 MD 88 KY
4 92 WA 00 NY* 12 MA 12 MA 80 VA 80 VA 79 MS* 78 TX* 06 GA 86 MA 12 NC 92 MA 88 WI
5 80 VA 16 NY 78 WA 16 MA 92 WA 12 MA 92 HI* 76 TX 06 TN 92 WA 12 VA 98 MD 98 TX
6 12 OH 96 NY* 80 VA 04 MA 94 WA 78 WA 72 GA 94 HI* 80 AL 14 IN 12 PA 74 NC 84 WI
7 14 MA 98 NY* 92 WA 76 GA 12 SC 79 MS* 88 MA 16 PA 06 MO 96 WA 96 WA 96 MD 78 IL
A
ll
e
le
c
ti
o
n
s
8 12 PA 72 LA* 79 MS* 74 GA 02 MA 04 MA 12 SC 86 AL* 86 WA 16 TN 16 PA 96 WA 02 IL
9 12 SC 04 NY* 16 MA 98 MA 12 MA 72 MO 84 MA 14 NC 86 FL 16 NC 72 KY 74 MN 14 MI
10 94 MN 78 WA 04 MA 08 MA 12 OH 12 SC 86 MA 76 TX* 80 IL 14 NC 98 AL 72 WI 16 MI
4.1. Correlations among measures. Before exploring how the measures described in Section 3 work on
individual elections, it is first worth considering how they correlate in the aggregate (cf. (Stephanopoulos &
McGhee, 2017)). We show in Figure 3 scatter plots of various pairs of measures. Note that EVW has been
omitted since it is numerically equivalent to MM. As Dec is not defined when one party sweeps all seats, the
thirteen such races have been omitted for consistency from all comparisons in the figure. Each scatter plot
thereby consists of 1,166 points. The “bow tie” appearance of the scatter plot for MM and Bias arises from
the fact, noted in (Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 2017) and perhaps elsewhere, that MM yields Bias when
multiplied by the responsiveness.
4.2. Historical outliers. We close our summary of historical elections by recording in Table 3 the outliers
for each measure among two different populations. This material is not used in the rest of the article and
is provided for the reader who is interested in seeing what each measure determines to be the most extreme
historical outliers.
For the first population, we restrict our attention to elections with at least seven seats in which each party
holds statewide support between 45% and 55%. There are 647 of these “balanced” elections in our data set.
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Figure 3. Scatter plots corresponding to various pairs of measures. Each plot
consists of the 1, 166 elections with at least seven districts and for which each party
wins at least one seat.
The second population considered is that of all elections with at least seven seats. There are 1,179 such
elections. In elections that are dominated by one party, the measures begin to break down. For example,
in an election in which one party receives more than two thirds of the vote: the 3-proportionality of EG2
implies that it is automatically unfair as one party cannot win more than 100% of the seats; the declination
will be undefined if one party sweeps all of the seats; and the counterfactuals required for the two versions
of partisan bias become daunting. Fortunately, even if a measure does poorly for imbalanced elections, it
may still have a role to play for balanced ones.
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Figure 4. Twelve hypothetical elections shown along with mean Democratic vote
fraction. These elections are evaluated by the various scaled measures in Table 4.
For the two declination variants and the lopsided-means test, elections in which the measures are undefined
are omitted from Table 3. Similarly, for EVW only anti-majoritarian elections are considered; for Lop only
elections in which the t-test indicates statistical significance are considered.
5. Hypothetical elections
In this section we introduce a number of hypothetical elections and evaluate our measures on them. By
choosing a small set of hypothetical elections of various types, we are able to identify potential false positives
and false negatives for each measure. These false positives/negatives are, of course, relative to the framework
of Section 2. This classification of fairness/unfairness might differ from the one made for an actual historical
election once additional factors, such as the geographic distribution of partisans, are taken into account.
5.1. The twelve hypothetical elections. Below are brief descriptions of the twelve hypothetical elections
considered in Figure 4; evaluations of the measures on these elections are provided in Table 4.
Our first four hypothetical elections should, according to Postulate 1, be evaluated as fair by a vote-
distribution measure.
A 1-proportionality (1-Prop). For moderate uniform swings, this election is the ideal vote distri-
bution according to EG0 and EG1v.
B 2-proportionality (2-Prop). The ideal vote distribution according to EG1.
C 3-proportionality (3-Prop). The ideal vote distribution according to EG2.
D Sweep (Sweep). Party D has swept the election with a statewide vote share of 64%. This particular
election corresponds to a constant of proportionality equal to 5. This election is similar to many
recent Massachusetts House elections. (see, e.g., Figure A4 in the appendix).
How the next four hypothetical elections should be evaluated is less straightforward. None is precisely
linear, though the first two are very close to linear. These first two have been included due to the presence
of a number of very competitive districts. Elections Uncomp and V-Uncomp, however, are notably un-
competitive. Neither of our two postulates is particularly pertinent for these latter two, although a measure
should evaluate both similarly if it is to have low sensitivity to competitiveness.
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E Competitive (Comp). This election has a number of very competitive races that all have swung
towards Party D.
F Competitive even (Comp’). Similar to the previous election, but with no districts in the “coun-
terfactual window” (i.e., between the majority party’s statewide support and 50% — see (McGhee,
2014)).
G Uncompetitive (Uncomp). An uncompetitive election as might arise from a bipartisan gerryman-
der; average winning margins for Republicans and Democrats are 41 and 35 points, respectively.
H Very uncompetitive (V-Uncomp). The previous election with average Republican and Demo-
cratic margins of victory increased by 30 and 20 points, respectively.
The next three elections are squarely covered by Postulate 2 and should be marked as unfair. Election
Inverted, a uniform shift of Election Classic, is more ambiguous. As it is not linear, we cannot apply
Postulate 1 to conclude that it is fair. On the other hand, since the average winning margin for the Democrats
is smaller than the average winning margin for the Republicans, we cannot apply Postulate 2 to conclude
it is unfair. In fact, the Democrats’ margin is so much smaller that it suggests, if anything, a Democratic
advantage. If this really were a Republican advantage, then in any reasonable electoral climate, it would
make much more sense to accept slightly less comfortable wins for a chance to win three additional seats.
I Cubic (Cubic). This is a symmetric distribution shifted moderately to the Democrats’ favor.
J Anti-majoritarian (Anti-M). This is election G subjected to a uniform swing in favor of the
Republicans.
K Classic (Classic). This distribution has all of the hallmarks of a partisan gerrymander: While
the parties are evenly split statewide, the Republicans win a significant majority through having
a number of narrow victories in contrast to their Democratic opponents whose few victories are
overwhelming. This distribution is very similar to the 2014 North Carolina US House election.
L Inverted (Inverted). This is dual to Classic. While the Republicans win a significant majority
of the vote, the Democrats are still able to win a significant portion of the seats through very narrow
victories.
5.2. Analysis of evaluations. In Table 4 we record the evaluations of the measures on the hypothetical
elections introduced in the previous section. The equal vote weights measure is not given its own column
since it is numerically equivalent to MM; the only anti-majoritarian election is I. We note that the t-test for
Lop was not statistically significant for any of the elections.
In Section 7 we discuss the performance of each measure in turn. For now we make only a few high-level
comments organized according to election. First we recall that the first six elections (1-Prop, 2-Prop,
3-Prop, Sweep, Comp and Comp’) should be evaluated as fair by Postulate 1; Elections Cubic, Anti-M
and Classic should be evaluated as unfair by Postulate 2; Elections Uncomp and V-Uncomp are at most
modestly unfair by Postulate 2; the situation of Election Inverted is unaddressed by either postulate. In
the table we have placed in bold those entries corresponding to false positives/negatives, as determined by
a somewhat arbitrary threshold of two standard deviations from the mean. As such, the bold entries in
the first six rows correspond to false positives. With two exceptions, these are confined to the variants of
the efficiency gap. First, the lopsided-means standard, Lop, evaluates Election 1-Prop as strongly in favor
of the Republicans. Second, the two variants of partisan bias come to very different conclusions regarding
Elections Comp and Comp’.
Similarly, the bold entries for Elections Cubic, Anti-M and Classic correspond to false negatives. For
Elections Uncomp and V-Uncomp we note that MM does not adhere to the Goldilocks Principle as the
doubling of winning margins leads to a doubling of the mean-median difference, although it is true that
it treats both as outliers. Election Inverted is, as mentioned, rather unusual. The measures come to
very different conclusions ranging from seeing it as strongly favoring the Democrats to strongly favoring the
Republicans. As discussed above, we believe it is correct to conclude that the election strongly favors the
Democrats. The partisan bias measure Bias comes to the surprising conclusion that it is strongly in favor
to the Republicans. The mean-median difference comes to the same conclusion, though less strongly, while
EG0, EG1v and EG
1
τ find the election to be fair.
We make one final note regarding the efficiency gap as it pertains to these data. As part of (McGhee &
Stephanopoulos, 2015), the authors propose a possible legal standard for identifying partisan gerrymandering
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Table 4. Values of scaled measures on hypothetical elections from Figure 4. Col-
umn N provides the number of districts in each election while the statewide Demo-
cratic vote share is indicated in the Mean column. Bold entries indicate false posi-
tives/negatives.
N Mean EG1 EG2 EG0 EG1v EG
2
v EG
1
τ Dec Dec
′ MM Bias Bias′ Lop
1-Prop 23 0.60 1.2 2.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0
2-Prop 25 0.60 0.3 1.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.9
3-Prop 25 0.60 -1.3 0.0 -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 -1.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.8
Sweep 10 0.64 -2.9 -1.0 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comp 12 0.52 -3.9 -3.4 -2.8 -2.7 -3.5 -2.7 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 -2.0 0.3
Comp’ 10 0.51 -2.4 -2.1 -1.7 -1.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -2.2 0.0 -0.5
Uncomp 10 0.52 -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -2.1 -1.1 -1.6 -0.5
V-Uncomp 10 0.52 -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -4.4 -1.1 -1.6 -1.4
Cubic 10 0.57 -2.1 -1.1 -2.1 -2.0 -2.2 -1.8 -2.5 -2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5
Anti-M 10 0.44 -2.9 -3.3 -1.4 -1.4 -2.3 -1.6 -2.0 -2.7 -2.1 -1.1 -1.6 -3.4
Classic 10 0.50 2.7 2.5 1.8 1.7 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.4 2.2 3.2 2.2
Inverted 10 0.30 -2.7 -4.9 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -0.3 -2.0 -3.2 1.4 2.2 -2.4 -5.0
incorporating a threshold for the efficiency gap. They suggest a threshold of 0.08 for state house plans and
of two seats for congressional plans. One can recover the unscaled efficiency gap scores by multiplying the
values in the EG1 column of Table 4 by the standard deviation of 0.07. Using either threshold, one can then
check that the only three elections that do not surpass the threshold are 2-Prop, Uncomp and V-Uncomp.
6. Sensitivity
As explored in Section 2, it only makes sense to pronounce a district plan as fair or not in the context of a
given electoral environment. As the electoral tide ebbs and flows, so will the performance of the plan. As such,
we fully expect the valuations of a plan to change from election to election. Nonetheless, moderate swings
should typically lead to moderate valuation changes. Or, if not, we should at least be able to characterize
when a given measure is particularly volatile so as to interpret the results accordingly.
In Figure 5 we illustrate the sensitivity of each measure to variations in the statewide vote share for four
of the hypothetical elections used in Section 5. (Plots for the remaining eight elections are included in the
appendix.) For each election, we apply a series of uniform shifts ranging between -5% and +5% and record
the valuation of each measure at each shift. This particular range has been chosen so as to correspond
with the generally accepted range for competitive elections as being those polling between 45% and 55% for
each party. The standardized measure values corresponding to no shift, -5% and +5% are marked by plus
signs, orange circles and purple squares, respectively. The equal vote weights standard is omitted since it is
numerically equivalent to the mean-median difference. We include Bias and MM for reference even though
it is immediate from their definitions that they are completely insensitive to uniform vote swings. We note
that similar sensitivity analyses have been conducted for various measures using historical election results
— see, for example, (Warrington, Mar 2018; McGhee & Stephanopoulos, 2015; Best et al., 2017). Also, it
is worth mentioning that an alternative approach to sensitivity would be to add in random noise to the
Democratic vote in each district.
Most measures are relatively stable for Election 2-Prop. The first exception is the lopsided-means
standard, Lop, which expects the Democrats’ average winning margin to go down as their statewide support
increases. Similarly, when the Democratic support increases, EG2 views the election as becoming more unfair
as proportionality drifts further from three. The measures EG1v and EG
0, which are dominated by the losing
wasted votes, have similar issues.
Election Comp highlights the strong sensitivity the efficiency-gap variants have to the number of seats
won. The measure Bias′, which is only interested in what happens at the observed statewide vote share
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Figure 5. Exploration of the sensitivity of measures to variation in statewide vote
share from -5% to +5% for four hypothetical elections.
and its complement, runs into similar trouble that can be traced back to the fact that seat shares are not
distributed evenly across the relevant vote shifts that are considered.
There is a fair amount of sensitivity for Election Comp’. We see this as appropriate. As the statewide vote
shifts, this election ranges from one that can be construed as reasonably fair to one in which the Democrats
unquestionably have a strong advantage. The measure Bias′ remains completely stable as no districts are
flipped under the vote shifts considered.
The sensitivities for Election Classic are similar to that for Election Uncomp. Again we see moderate
sensitivity as appropriate given the range from an election in which the Republicans have much narrower
winning margins on average to one in which the difference is much more moderate.
7. Discussion
The investigations of the previous two sections serve to illuminate various strengths and weaknesses of
each measure. We now proceed to summarize what we have learned. From Table 4, it is clear that for
the elections chosen, the declination variants perform the best. These measures are undefined for Election
Sweep, but have neither false positives nor false negatives on the remainder. We also believe Election
Inverted is evaluated appropriately by both. The other measures all have at least three instances of being
undefined, having a false positive, or having a false negative among the twelve elections. Looking beyond the
two versions of the declination, if one is wishes to minimize false positives, then the mean-median difference,
MM, or partisan bias, Bias, is probably the best, at least when the statewide vote is close to even. As
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these measures look at particular parts of the seats-votes curve, they may also work better when you have
a competitive state in which the gerrymandering is localized; the other measures, by averaging over many
districts, are less likely to pick up on gerrymandering in just one or two districts. If one wishes to minimize
false negatives, then EG1 is a good choice.
The Goldilocks Principle suggests that the measures should have moderate amounts of sensitivity to both
statewide vote share and competitiveness. Both Bias and MM lack any sensitivity to statewide vote share.
On the other hand the variants of the efficiency gap are all prone to extreme sensitivity to vote share when
there are a large number of competitive races. The declination and buffered declination both have moderate
sensitivity in the elections considered; this is true of the Lop and Bias′ as well. So on sensitivity grounds as
well we view these four as the best performers.
The elections considered provide limited data regarding sensitivity to overall competitiveness. As noted
above, the mean-median difference is perhaps too sensitive to competitiveness as evidenced by the different
evaluations of Elections Uncomp and V-Uncomp. On the other hand, the efficiency gap variants perhaps
aren’t sensitive enough to the highly competitive nature of Elections Comp and Comp’.
We now discuss the pros and cons of each measure in more detail.
7.1. Variants of the efficiency gap. A few of the measures are unusable as measures of partisan gerry-
mandering. EG0, EG1v and EG
2 are all measures of proportionality that do not comport with the historical
“winner’s bonus” that is seen in actuality. It is unreasonable to adhere to a measure of fairness for which
the majority of historical plans are automatically given to be far from fair. The final variant of the efficiency
gap, EG2v is perhaps the most promising, though its evaluation of Election 3-Prop is a mark in its disfavor.
Given its general concurrence with other efficiency gap variants, especially EG1 itself, there are not clear
reasons, from the point of view of this article, to consider it or EG1τ separately. (We allow, however, that
there may be legal reasons that make EG2v more attractive.)
7.2. Mean-median difference and partisan bias. As noted previously, MM and Bias are closely related.
Neither takes into account the fraction of seats won by each party at the observed statewide vote level (unless
each party happens to have equal statewide support of 50%). As such, they are completely insensitive to
uniform vote swings.
As such, these measures miss one of, if not the, primary goals of partisan gerrymandering. As shown in the
appendix, the outlier elections for MM are heavily skewed towards ones with few competitive races. Among
hypothetical elections it does reasonably well in that it marks the proportional and competitive elections
as fair. But it only views the classic gerrymander and inverted gerrymander as moderately unusual. As
discussed in (Warrington, Mar 2018) and elsewhere, packing and cracking can occur in such as a way as to
be completely missed by MM when the statewide Democratic support deviates even moderately from 50%.
It is generally acknowledged that this measure is not useful when statewide support of the two parties is
unequal.
Partisan bias, in both its variants, performs similarly to MM. Bias badly misvalues the partisan advantage
in Election Comp, but gives what we view as reasonable answers for the other hypothetical elections. Bias′
performs similarly, except that it is Election Comp’ that it badly misjudges. The large uniform shift required
for elections in which statewide support is far from even causes issues for Bias and, even more so, for Bias′.
7.3. Efficiency gap. The efficiency gap has as both a strength and a weakness the fact that it enshrines
a historical average as an ideal. By its very definition, any election that deviates far from this ideal is a
good subject for further investigation. As shown in the appendix (see Figures A3 and A4), the elections it
tends to flag as outliers are unusual in some respect (e.g., a large number of very competitive seats). Yet
there are also valid reasons for proportionality to deviate from 2-proportionality (e.g., a large number of very
competitive seats) and EG1 is not able to account for these.
7.4. Declination. We see the declination and buffered declination as robust measures. A major advantage
of them, in our view, is that they are agnostic about the slope of the seats-votes curve. They just ask for
the differential responsiveness to be low. As a further point of support, Dec provably increases in absolute
value under packing and cracking, as shown in (Warrington, Mar 2018). Disadvantages of Dec and Dec′ are
their inability to provide an evaluation when one party sweeps the election and their sensitivity when one
party wins only one or two seats, although this latter property is less true by design for Dec′.
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7.5. Lopsided means. The lopsided means measure is predicated on the notion that unequal average
winning vote shares are indicative of unfairness. This is true when the two parties have exactly equal
support statewide: In this case, having a higher average winning vote share is equivalent to winning fewer
seats. However, the logic behind this test fails even for moderate swings in statewide support. Average
winning margins are very relevant to the matter of partisan asymmetry, but they must be interpreted in
the context of seats won, as the declination does. Given the similarities in definition between Lop and Dec
and the superior results of the latter, we see no reason to use the lopsided-means measure, especially not in
conjunction with the Student t-test (see Section 7.6).
7.6. Lopsided-means test. The lopsided-means test claims to ascertain in a statistically rigorous manner
whether the winning margins of each party could have reasonably arisen by chance. But the application of
this test is highly problematic. While the venerable t-test is a workhorse of statistics, we do not believe that
it is appropriately applied in the lopsided-means test.
Here, for example, is an instance in which a uniform shift in the direction of one party causes the average
winning vote share of the new majority party goes up. Begin with evenly matched parties in a state with
25 districts and with district-level Democratic support ranging linearly from 0.3 to 0.7. The Democrats and
Republicans each have average winning vote shares equal to 0.61. If there is a uniform swing of +5% in the
Democrats favor, we end up with district-level Democratic support ranging linearly from 0.35 to 0.75:
0.35, 0.366¯, 0.383¯, 0.416¯, . . . , 0.733¯, 0.75.
The Democrats now win 15 seats (60%) with an average winning vote share of 0.63 while the Republicans
win 10 seats with an average winning vote share of 0.58. The Student t-test results in a z-value of 2.16
and a p-value of approximately 0.04. As this is less than 0.05, according to the lopsided-means test, this
is statistically significant and indicative of gerrymandering. But it is hard to see how this linear vote
distribution, shifted only five points, could suddenly be strongly unfair, especially since the responsiveness
has a historically reasonable value of two. As such, we view this as a false positive. Similar examples can be
constructed in which a symmetric distribution is shifted slightly in the Democrats’ favor, yet in which their
average winning margin decreases.
Nor is it difficult to construct examples that are false negatives. Consider now a hypothetical district plan
with Democratic support among 15 districts given by
0.4, 0.41, 0.42, 0.43, 0.44, 0.45, 0.46, 0.47, 0.48, 0.49, 0.52, 0.55, 0.58, 0.61, 0.64.
Democratic support statewide is 0.49, yet the Democrats win only one third of the seats in this scenario.
The average winning shares in this case are 0.585 (Democrats) and 0.55 (Republicans). The t-test returns
a z-value of 1.25 with a p-value of 0.23. Yet Postulate 2 applies. While this vote distribution is less unfair
than recent House distributions for Pennsylvania or North Carolina, it is certainly reminiscent of them.
Another issue with the lopsided means test arises when it is applied to an election with imputed vote
values. While any measure will vary according to the imputation strategy, the t-test claims a precision that
does not capture the true uncertainty involved. As an example, we consider recent Wisconsin state assembly
elections as considered in (Wang, 2016, Fig. 5A). For the 2010 election, for instance, Wang indicates a
difference in average winning vote share of about one percent that is not statistically significant according to
the t-test (t-statistic of −0.56 and p-value of 0.57). This value is computed using imputed vote shares of 0.75
and 0.25 for the winner and loser, respectively in each uncontested district. But since a significant fraction
of the races in the election were uncontested in 2010 — 31 out of 99 — a different imputation strategy can
yield markedly different results. For instance, when we impute vote shares for uncontested races using a
hierarchical model as in (Warrington, Mar 2018)5, the difference in winning vote shares becomes about 3%
and the t-statistic is computed as −2.15 which is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03. For elections
with few uncontested seats, the exact imputation strategy implied will be of minor importance. But when
this is not the case, the imputed support, depending on how it is done, can lead to more confidence that a
difference is statistically significant than is warranted.
5The model consisted of random district, state and year effects as well as indicator variables for which party won
the election and for which party, if any, had an incumbent.
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7.7. Equal vote weights test. The equal vote weights test is a reasonable proposal assuming the validity
of the mean-median measure. It takes a conservative-sounding approach of restricting its attention to
only elections that are anti-majoritarian. As its creators acknowledge (Best et al., 2017), this restricts
its applicability. Fundamentally, though, it does not appear to flag particularly interesting elections (see
Figure A9 in Appendix). An anti-majoritarian outcome is unquestionably a red flag, but it is not clear
how the inclusion of the mean-median difference improves our ability to identify likely gerrymanders. If one
wishes to only impose an anti-majoritarian requirement, we believe it would be more effectively done —
on a quantitative level — with the declination rather than with the mean-median difference. We also note
that with the endogenous data we use in this article, only about ten percent of elections with at least seven
districts result in an anti-majoritarian outcome. This measure is probably best used in elections for which
both parties enjoy equal statewide support and for which any gerrymandering is local in nature. Another
scenario in which it is more likely to be useful is when there are many seats.
8. Conclusion
This article has focused on measures that attempt to ascertain how consistent a given vote distribution
is with that produced by a partisan gerrymander. We conclude that the declination, Dec, and buffered
declination, Dec′, are the most successful at avoiding false positives and false negatives among the elections
considered. Their only failing is that they are undefined on elections in which one party does not win any
seats. They also appear to be relatively robust with regards to sensitivity. And while Dec′ may perform
better when one party wins only a seat or two, for simplicity, Dec is probably the best choice overall.
As noted in detail in the discussion, each of the other measures has serious drawbacks. When there are
few competitive elections, EG1 and EG2v might be useful. However, when statewide support is evenly split,
MM and Bias might be useful, especially when any alleged gerrymandering is localized to only a few districts.
When one is particularly interested in anti-majoritarian outcomes, EVW might be a good choice. We do
not see any scenario in which EG2, EG0, EG1v, EG
1
τ or Lop is worth employing.
The framework we employ is a narrow one that intentionally ignores many of the complexities arising in
the partisan gerrymandering problem. By limiting the scope of what we ask of our measures, we can do a
better job of identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each measure as well as what election characteristics
are likely to lead to false positives and false negatives. Such errors are inevitable and must be well understood
to be dealt with. Once these quantitative issues are carefully addressed, it becomes easier to create reliable
ensemble measures (see (Cain et al., 2018) for a related discussion in the context of computer simulations)
or to tackle the much larger task of creating a manageable standard for gerrymandering.
For most of the measures we consider, perturbations to the statewide vote translate into changes in the
evaluations of the measures, as shown in Section 6. But too much sensitivity can cause trouble when one is
trying to ascertain whether a particular value is meaningful. In (McGann et al., 2016), the author uses a
measure of partisan symmetry proposed in (Gelman & King, 1994b) that averages the bias over a range of
Democratic vote shares between 45% and 55% (see discussion in (Nagle, December 2015)). Similar averaging
procedures are an obvious way to increase confidence that a slight change in statewide support wouldn’t lead
to a drastically different evaluation by any given measure. Such techniques could easily be implemented for
most of the measures we consider in this article.
There are many other future directions for study. An obvious direction is to focus more directly on
historical data (as is done briefly in Table 3 and the appendix). By pronouncing certain historical district
plans as fair or not fair, one could perform an analysis similar to the one we have performed in this paper.
For example, if the elections in Table 3 were independently classified as fair or unfair, we would have
additional evidence regarding the utility of the measures considered. Such an analysis, especially one that
took into account unequal turnout among districts, would bring even more confidence in the applicability of
any conclusions to future elections. A better understanding of how measures react to different numbers of
districts would also be helpful. Many state legislatures have more than one hundred seats. The seats-votes
curve in such a situation is much closer to a continuous curve than to the step function it typically is for
congressional elections. Analyses that focus on local district plans or that consider how these measures might
apply to multi-member districts would also be useful. Beyond that we broaden into matters such as how
partisans are distributed geographically. Such issues are central to how we should interpret the valuations
we get as we move towards making real-world decisions using these measures. Inherent advantages from
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geography, for example, appear to be very real (Chen & Rodden, 2013), but if they are modest, then it may
be possible in most cases to take extreme values of a given measure at face value.
While we believe quantitative partisan gerrymandering measures to be important for solving the partisan
gerrymandering problem, they form only one piece of the puzzle. In particular, we expect computer simu-
lations (such as found in (Bangia et al., 2017)) and compactness metrics to continue to play a central role.
Combining all of these techniques into a single robust tool would be of great benefit. Of course, exactly
how such a tool would be used is still an open question. The US Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Gill v.
Whitford (Gill) did little to clarify whether partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. If they are, then
it is reasonable to suppose that partisan-gerrymandering measures will provide supporting evidence even if
they are not the basis of the constitutional claim itself. And, as we have already mentioned, we expect these
measures to be useful for many different groups during any redistricting process. The better choice we make
for which measures to use, the more useful they will be.
9. Data collection and Statistical methods
The US state legislature election data up through 2010 comes from (Klarner et al., 2013-01-11). We
only included data on the lower house of the state legislature when two houses exist. The US congressional
data through 2014 was provided by (Jacobson, 2017). Data for 2016 congressional races were taken from
Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2017). See (Redacted) for details of data and imputation strategy.
The election data was analyzed using the python-based SageMath (Stein et al., 2016). All non-library code
may be found at (Warrington, 2018a). Python packages employed were pyStan (Team, 2016) for implement-
ing a multilevel model to impute votes in uncontested races; Matplotlib (Hunter, 2007) and Seaborn (Waskom
et al., 2014) for plotting and visualization; and SciPy (Jones et al., 2001–) for statistical methods. The data
reported in this article are archived at (Redacted).
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A1. Appendix
In this section we present the sensitivity evaluations for the other eight hypothetical elections. We also
collect plots of two different collections of elections. The first set consists of the most extreme outliers for
each measure, both for all elections in our historical data set as well as for the subset consisting of those for
which the statewide Democratic support is between 45% and 55%. The second set collects those elections
for which the measures disagree most strongly. In this second set we only consider the measures Dec′, MM,
Bias and EG1.
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Figure A1. Exploration of the sensitivity of measures to variation in statewide
vote share from -5% to +5% for four hypothetical elections.
A1.1. Sensitivity.
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Figure A2. Exploration of the sensitivity of measures to variation in statewide
vote share from -5% to +5% for four hypothetical elections.
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A1.2. Outliers.
Figure A3. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections for EG2, EG1, EG0,
EG1v and EG
2
v. In this and later figures, values of measures listed are for the rescaled
versions.
Figure A4. Most extreme outliers among all elections for EG2, EG1, EG0, EG1v and EG
2
v.
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Figure A5. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for EG1τ .
Figure A6. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for the declination, Dec.
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Figure A7. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for the buffered declination, Dec′.
Figure A8. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for the mean-median difference, MM.
Figure A9. Most extreme outliers among all elections for EVW. The same three
elections are identified among the subpopulation of balanced elections.
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Figure A10. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for partisan bias, Bias.
Figure A11. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for partisan bias, Bias′.
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Figure A12. Most extreme outliers among balanced elections (top row) and all
elections (bottom row) for the lopsided-means test, Lop. Elections shown are re-
stricted to those for which the Student t-test implies significance.
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Figure A13. Greatest pairwise disagreements between Dec and Bias among bal-
anced elections (top row) and all elections (bottom row).
Figure A14. Greatest pairwise disagreements between Dec and MM among bal-
anced elections (top row) and all elections (bottom row).
A1.3. Greatest pairwise disagreements.
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Figure A15. Greatest pairwise disagreements between EG1 and Dec among bal-
anced elections (top row) and all elections (bottom row).
Figure A16. Greatest pairwise disagreements between EG1 and Bias among bal-
anced elections (top row) and all elections (bottom row).
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Figure A17. Greatest pairwise disagreements between EG1 and MM among bal-
anced elections (top row) and all elections (bottom row).
Figure A18. Greatest pairwise disagreements between MM and Bias among bal-
anced elections (top row) and all elections (bottom row).
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